The Fourth Amendment provides important constitutional limits on abusive policing. . Those expectations must at times give way to "compelling police interest[s]" (People v Class, 63 NY2d 491, 495 [1984], revd and remanded by New York v Class, 475 US 106 [1986], reaffirmed on state constitutional grounds by People v Class, 67 NY2d 431 [1986]). To the extent that the dictum in Sciacca was referring to a scenario where a search warrant only describes a particular structure, it has no application where, as here, instead of limiting the search to a specific structure, the search warrant authorizes a search of the "entire premises," which, as particularized in this case, included the house as well as surrounding private property. In a 2017 case involving Wall Street financier Benjamin Wey, defense attorney David Siegal, said that FBI agents had gone too far in their search for random items during a raid on Wey's office and residence. . Adopting the People's position would lead to the incongruous result that proof that a vehicle had an ongoing connection with a property would be insufficient to justify a search, while a warrant application that makes no mention of the vehicle would somehow provide greater cause to search that vehicle. The right of the people to be secure in their persons , houses , papers , and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. That belief, in turn, appears to be grounded in a series of inapposite New York cases decided prior to the seminal Supreme Court case, United States v Ross (456 US 798 [1982]). No such connections were made here. July 31, 2019. I disagree. 211214. The Supreme Court has held that a passing parallel reference to the State and Federal Constitutions is insufficient to satisfy the plain-statement rulei.e., that a case was decided on a state-law ground (see e.g. March 20, 2019. Defendant sought to suppress all evidence seized from the Nissan and Chevrolet. In doing so, we must "marshal[] distinct state texts and histories and draw our [own] conclusions" in order to "dignify state constitutions as independent sources of law" (Jeffrey S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American Constitutional Law 177 [2018]). This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. These protections take shape in two ways . I see no persuasive rationale why, if a bicycle and a car are parked next to each other on a driveway, it is reasonable to search the bicycle's closed basket but unreasonable to search the car's trunk. We decline to distort our preservation rule in such a manner where, as here, the claim was brought to the attention of the courts below, litigated by the parties, and addressed by the courts. The application contained no mention of the existence of the vehicles ultimately searched, much less evidence connecting them to any criminality. InJune 13, 2017, U.S. District Judge Alison Nathan delivered a blistering account ofthoseFBI raidsWey's attorney. This not only underscores that the corresponding state and federal constitutional provisions reach the same result, but also demonstrates that, traditionally, the Court "follow[ed] a policy of uniformity with the federal courts" when considering search-and-[*9]seizure arguments (Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 St. John's L Rev 399, 417 [1987]; see e.g. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. Likewise, the People attempt to distinguish People v Dumper by arguing that the salient difference in Dumper was that the vehicle was driven onto the property during the execution of the warrant. Indeed, the cases cited by defendant predate the "dawn of active New York State constitutionalism" in the 1980s, before which the "state constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures mostly lay judicially dormant" (Robert M. Pitler, Independent State Search and Seizure Constitutionalism: The New York State Court of Appeals' Quest for Principled Decisionmaking, 62 Brook L Rev 1, 103, 213 [1996]). . This case considers, for the first time in Georgia, the effect of the State's delay in obtaining search warrants for data contained in electronic devices when those devices were originally seized in a warrantless, but lawful, manner by police. You may opt-out by. Additionally no observation was reported as to any movement of persons between the house and the van. 238453. G.R. We first held that the underlying warrant for the residence lacked sufficient factual allegations to authorize a search of the residence (Dumper, 28 NY2d at 298). Video, Inc., 475 US 868, 872 n 4 [1986] [same, where the opinion "cited the New York Constitution only once, near the beginning of its opinion, and in the same parenthetical also cited the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution"]). Applying the doctrine of severability, we upheld the search of Hansen's residence but directed that the evidence seized from the van should be suppressed. Disclaimer: Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. The police chief has said the department needs more supervisors. Instead, defendant supported his suppression argument with citations to this Court's decisions in Rainey, Dumper, Hansen, and Sciacca. Biden then recalled the outspoken Georgia Republican's recent allegations regarding fentanyl deaths. and the entire premises" from which Mr. Gordon was seen emerging. Nonetheless, as part of the search of the "entire premises," police officers searched two vehicles found onsite: a Nissan Maxima and a Chevrolet sedan. at 21 [emphasis added]). Thus, the majority upsetsto say the leastthis Court's well settled preservation rules holding that defendant preserved an argument that the State Constitution provides heightened protection simply by citing several New York cases in which the sole reference to the New York Constitution is in a parallel cite with the Federal Constitution. 2651 PDF G.R. In Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405 (2005), this Court held that a dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable seizures. I write and consult on federal criminal law and criminal justice. Here, no vehicle was designated or described in the warrant, and the People have not argued that the police had probable cause to engage in a search of anything outside of what was designated or described in the warrant. Mr. Gordon based his argument on several of our prior decisions, including People v Dumper (28 NY2d 296 [1971]) and People v Hansen (38 NY2d 17 [1975], abrogated on other grounds by People v Ponder, 54 NY2d 160 [1981] [abrogating automatic standing]). Our statement in that case, unrelated to specific facts before the Court, that "a warrant to search a building does not include authority to search vehicles at the premises" (id. Yet that statement represents our Court's understanding of the meaning of our prior decisions in Hansen and Dumper, one that, as we noted in Sciacca, accords with the legislature's prescription of "what and who" are subject to search pursuant to a New York warrant (see CPL 690.15 [1] ["A search warrant must direct a search of one or more of the following: (a) A designated or described place or premises; (b) A designated or described vehicle . 2021 NY Slip Op 01093 Get free summaries of new New York Court of Appeals opinions delivered to your inbox! Instead, this Court has repeatedly held that, to preserve a state constitutional argument, a defendant must specifically argue below that the New York Constitution provides greater protection than the Federal Constitution (see e.g. Over several days, police officers observed Mr. Gordon selling heroin from his home; in addition to the surveillance, undercover officers engaged in drug transactions with Mr. Gordon and conducted a controlled buy using an informant. The court issued a search warrant authorizing a search of Defendant's "person" and the "entire premises." The Justice Department cited the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege in demanding testimony from a lawyer representing former President Donald Trump in his documents case. Additionally, all of those cases either directly rely on federal case law, or rely on New York cases that turned on federal case law, in deciding the search-and-seizure issues before them (see Sciacca, 45 NY2d at 127-129; Hansen, 38 NY2d at 21-23; Dumper, 28 NY2d at 299; Rainey, 14 NY2d at 38). Although this Court has, starting in the 1980s, adopted "independent standards" under the State Constitution,[FN10] we have also continued to stress that the history of article I, 12 of the New York Constitution "supports the presumption" that the provision against unlawful searches and seizures conforms with that found in the Fourth Amendment (People v P.J. Failing to do so, we accomplish the reverse. The garage was completely distinct, indeed incidental, to any illegal activity" (id. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed, and we now do so as well. Judges Rivera, Stein and Fahey concur. Nevertheless, the majority insists that vehicles are special containers, arbitrarily favoring vehicles over other transportable containers, such as backpacks and rollable luggage, and containers normally located outdoors, such as mailboxes. Because a driveway and a backyard located within the curtilage are part of the "entire premises," there was no constitutional impediment to the police search of the two vehicles. But those are all well settled reasons why there is a reduced expectation of privacy in automobilesnot reasons to invent greater protections for them (see e.g. Read more. 690) and decisional law"]). Five Memphis police officers pleaded not guilty to murder charges in the beating death of Mr. Nichols. Supreme Court's probable cause analysis is consonant with our prior cases and the record supports its finding, affirmed by the Appellate Division, that the warrant application failed to establish probable cause to search the two vehicles. The actions of the investigators in breaking and entering into the building were unreasonable, as there was "no evidence whatever which would indicate that the garage was a premises where the controlled activity was taking place. As the Supreme Court has explained, "[e]ven though such a distinction perhaps could evolve in a series of cases in which paper bags, locked trunks, lunch buckets, and orange crates were placed on one side of the line or the other, the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment forecloses such a distinction" (id.). at 402 [the "ultimate mandate of reasonableness" "depend(s) upon the facts and circumstances"]). The People opposed, arguing that the search warrant was not restricted to the private dwelling, but authorized the search of the "entire premises," which includes the house located at the address as well as the surrounding curtilage, and that the search of the vehicles parked thereon was reasonable as they could and did contain contraband sought by the warrant. Search and Seizure. Our Court has never adopted a "fixed analytical formula for determining when the proper protection of fundamental rights requires resort to the State Constitution" (Scott, 79 NY2d at 491). Video, Inc., 68 NY2d 296, 304 [1986], quoting People v Johnson, 66 NY2d 398, 406-407 [1985]). Shield to look into the matter. That Court did, however, leave no doubtat least in the view of any other court to consider the issuethat the Fourth Amendment permits the search of containers found on the premises, such as the vehicles here. at 825; see People v Langen, 60 NY2d 170, 180-181 [1983] [applying Ross and declining to adopt a different rule under the New York State Constitution]). We explained: "The observations of the police were that this van had made 'trips in and out carrying at least one other person in addition to the driver', and that it was 'the sole vehicle observed entering and leaving these premises on a regular basis'. at 127) is dictum and, in any event, lacks context as to its intended application. As in Hansen, "no observation was reported as to any movement of persons between the house and the [vehicles]" (Hansen, 38 NY2d at 20) that would substantiate a belief that the vehicles searched were utilized in the alleged criminal activity. If, as the dissent says, trafficking in drugs provides probable cause to search vehicles, the officers can set forth the results of their investigation, describe the vehicles they have observed, and [*6]make their case to the magistrate. Here, by contrast, the question is whether the officers exceeded the scope of a valid search warrant for evidence of an illicit drug business conducted from the premisesan issue not addressed by this Court in Hansen. The Court broadly stated that a "lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search" (Ross, 456 US at 820-821). United States v Evans, 92 F3d 540, 543 [7th Cir 1996] ["It seems to us that a car parked in a garage is just another interior container, like a closet or a desk"]; United States v Percival, 756 F2d 600, 612 [7th Cir 1985] ["Although a car is less fixed than a closet or cabinet, . Here, based on the uncontroverted probable cause to believe that defendant was engaged in drug trafficking on and around the premises of his residence, the warrant directed to the "entire premises" was sufficiently particular to "enable the searcher to identify the persons, places or things that [a court] has previously determined should be searched or seized" (see People v Nieves, 36 NY2d 396, 401 [1975]). However, we held that the police lacked sufficient evidence to search a vehicle that had been seen coming and going from the residence. Even were we to put aside the contrary reasoning of Hansen and Dumper, the dissent never addresses the fundamental tenets of our search warrant jurisprudence: it is the magistrate, and not the police officer, who determines the scope of the search conducted pursuant to a warrant (Hanlon, 36 NY2d at 559; P.J. As an initial matter, these cases are factually distinguishable in pivotal aspects from the issue we are deciding and are not in conflict with Ross. The purpose of this site is to provide information from and about the Judicial Branch of the U.S. Government. Instead, we exercise our independent authority to follow our existing state constitutional jurisprudence, even if federal constitutional jurisprudence has changed, because "we are persuaded that the proper safeguarding of fundamental constitutional rights requires that we do so" (Scott, 79 NY2d at 480; see generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv L Rev 489 [1977]; Jeffrey S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American Constitutional Law 16-20 [2018] [counseling against state high courts engaging in "lockstepping" and describing instead the virtues of independent assessments of parallel constitutional provisions]; Goodwin Liu, State Courts and Constitutional Structure, 128 Yale LJ 1304, 1311 [2019] [noting that "redundancy (of constitutional interpretation) makes innovation and variation possible and, for that reason, is a vital feature of our federal system"]). Siegal's argument was that such a search was a violation of 4th Amendment rights and submitted a motion toUS District Judge Sandra J. Feuerstein that any evidence gathered in the raid shouldbe suppressed. We cannot accept the argument that the entry into the private garage was a permissible incident of the right to search pursuant to a warrant. Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the search warrant contained no references to the vehicles to be searched, the record supported the finding that there was no probable cause to search the vehicles. Acting pursuant to the authority to search the "entire premises," the police canvassed both apartments and the shed, retrieving from the latter a check writer and set of blank checks believed to have been used in the suspect's check-forging activities. LARRY SABUCO MANIBOG, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. at 126-127). But it is equally important that ambiguous or obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand as barriers to a determination by this Court of the validity under the federal constitution of state action'"]). Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law 431. Posted by Brett McGarry. To address the continued viability of caselaw premised upon our interpretation of both the U.S. and the State Constitutions, we now clarify thatat the very leastthose cases accurately set forth our state constitutional law. . The officers stopped the man, subjected him to a patdown search, and then inspected the interior of the vehicle for other weapons. Siegal, one of the top white collar attorneys in the country and a former federal prosecutor, has uncoveredyet another 4th Amendment violation, this one in the Eastern District of New York. For reasons explained above, Mr. Gordon is correct that adopting the People's position would amount to a substantial deviation from the rule to which we have adhered under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 12 of the State Constitution, requiring warrants to provide particularization between vehicles and real property, even when a vehicle is located on real property.[FN3]. . In this area of constitutional law, we have set forth principles that would be unduly weakened by the People's preferred rule (see People v Johnson, 66 NY2d 398, 407 [1985]). In Dumper, the search warrant was similarly directed at discrete structures, including "a one story wood frame cottage with white sidewall, green roof" and a "cottage east of a main house" (id. . United States v Pennington, 287 F3d 739, 745 [8th Cir 2002]; United States v Percival, 756 F2d 600, 611-613 [7th Cir 1985]). Worse still, the majority's preservation rule will have the effect of transforming those same cases, and any other cases that employ parallel citations to the State and Federal Constitutions, into seminal state constitutional decisions, irrespective of the fact that those cases are wholly devoid of any basis for concluding that the New York Constitution provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment in the context of the issues they addressed. Defendant did not support that argument with any state constitutional analysis. at 299). Rainey established that probable cause to search a suspect's residence did not encompass the authority to search a separate residence, even if both were located on the same premises. Defendant's [*7]expectation of privacy in the vehicles is not disputed. The factual materials prepared for the search warrant made no mention of any vehicles associated with Mr. Gordon or the premises as allegedly being involved in the observed criminal activity. I dissent. Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you.